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The Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA) is a complex statute with very
significant sanctions for creditors that fail to comply with its requirements.
Debtors’ attorneys seek to claim that a transaction is subject to the WCA’s
mandates, and of course, creditors’ attorneys seek to deny coverage. This
Article addresses the coverage issue by focusing on the three consumer
credit transactions that are expressly subject to WCA coverage, and on the
two most common transactions excluded from WCA coverage. The three
transactions expressly subject to WCA coverage are consumer sales,
consumer leases, and open-ended credit plans. Each distinct transaction
has its own unique interpretation issues that will determine WCA
coverage of the transaction depending upon the court's interpretation of
the transaction. The two most common exclusions under the WCA are
consumer credit transactions that exceed $25,000, and the first lien real
estate mortgage. There are actually three different transactions that
qualify under the $25,000 exclusion and each one is separately identified
and explained. Finally, the first lien real estate mortgage exclusion is
analyzed with particular attention focused on identifying those types of
interests that qualify as an “equivalent security interest.”
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1. WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2)(b) (2011–2012).
2. See WIS. STAT. Ch. 425.
3. See WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2)(d).
4. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10).
5. See Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 763 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (deciding
“whether [] rent-to-own contracts are consumer credit sales under the WCA”); DeGrave v.
Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1607, at *1 (Dec. 17, 1996) (deciding
whether the co-op’s transactions constituted an open-end credit plan or ordinary credit
transaction); Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS 202, at *3 (Feb.
22, 1994) (deciding whether a car lease is a commercial or consumer lease).
6. See WIS. STAT. § 422.308.
7. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
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The Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA) is a complex statute designed
1
to protect consumers from sharp practices by merchants. At its heart, it
is a disclosure statute. It mandates stiff penalties against merchants who
2
fail to comply with its many statutory requirements. The primary
transaction that triggers mandated compliance with the WCA is the
3
consumer credit transaction.
There are three credit transactions that are specifically identified by
the WCA as consumer credit transactions—consumer credit sales,
4
Each one of these
consumer leases, and open-end credit plans.
consumer credit transactions has presented interpretation problems that
5
have perplexed the courts. For consumer credit sales, the problem is
distinguishing true leases or bailments, which are not subject to the
WCA, from disguised sales, which are covered by the WCA. The WCA
only partially addresses this problem. For consumer leases, the problem
is distinguishing commercial leases from consumer leases. And finally,
open-end credit plans have enhanced disclosure requirements under the
6
WCA. But, it is not an easy task to distinguish an open-end credit plan,
with its enhanced disclosure requirements, from an ordinary credit
transaction, which has less disclosure requirements, from a “cash
transaction,” which has no disclosure requirements. The first part of
this Article will provide a comprehensive analysis of each one of these
consumer credit transactions.
The second part of this Article will focus on the two most common
exclusions under the WCA—consumer transactions that exceed $25,000
and the first lien real estate mortgage exclusion. There are actually
three exclusionary clauses that are part of the $25,000 exclusion: (1)
consumer credit transactions where the amount financed exceeds
7
$25,000; (2) motor vehicle consumer leases where the total lease
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8

obligation exceeds $25,000; and (3) any other consumer transaction
9
where the cash price exceeds $25,000. Each clause has its own unique
interpretation issues. For the first exclusionary clause, courts have
struggled with determining whether a charge should be considered a
10
finance charge, an additional charge, or part of the amount financed.
In addition, when there are multiple advances between the parties,
should the $25,000 cap be applied against each individual advance or
simply the total of the advances? Also, can a single advance become
subject to the WCA even though it is greater than $25,000? A number
of issues have arisen with reference to the motor vehicle consumer lease
exclusion. How to calculate the four-month lease period, and how to
11
calculate the total lease obligation are common issues. Finally, with
regard to the third exclusionary clause, the two primary issues are what
transactions are covered by “any other consumer transaction,” and how
should the “cash price” be calculated.
As a final matter, the scope of the first lien real estate mortgage
exclusion is examined. There are a number of issues considered under
this exclusion. One primary issue is what kind of interests qualify as an
“equivalent security interest” to a first lien on real estate. Also, when
the first lien holder makes future advances, particularly difficult priority
issues arise between the first and second lien holders.
A. Consumer Credit Sale

C M
Y K
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8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.
11. See LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 594, 589 N.W.2d 425, 430
(Ct. App. 1998); see also Raneda v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 02-2149, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS
616, at **1213 (July 1, 2003).
12. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10).
13. See, e.g., Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 79, 87,
365 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Ct. App. 1985) (“[A] consumer credit sale is also a consumer credit
transaction. . . . The former is a species of the latter because the legislature so provided.”).
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A consumer credit sale is one of the four types of consumer credit
12
transactions expressly identified in the WCA. In fact, most consumer
transactions would qualify as both a consumer credit sale and a
13
consumer credit transaction.
The elements of a consumer credit
transaction and a consumer credit sale are essentially the same with one
noted addition. A consumer credit sale is defined as “a sale of goods,
services or an interest in land to a customer on credit where the debt is
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payable in installments or a finance charge is imposed.” All the basic
elements of a consumer credit sale (goods, services, or an interest in
land; credit; payable in installments; and finance charge) were analyzed
15
in an earlier article. However, the definition of consumer credit sale
expands the coverage of the WCA by including within it bailments and
leases where the bailee or lessee pays or agrees to pay the agreed price
and can become or has the option to become the owner of the leased or
16
bailed property for no additional or nominal consideration. If the
transaction does not provide that the lessee or bailee has the
opportunity to become the owner of the property, the transaction
17
cannot be a consumer credit sale.
The expansion of the coverage of the WCA through the noted
addition to the consumer credit sale definition was designed to address
the issue of whether a lease or bailment transaction is a true lease or
18
bailment or a credit transaction disguised as a lease or bailment. The
drafters of the WCA obviously wanted to include within its scope not
only all traditional consumer credit transactions, but also disguised ones
19
as well. This issue was first encountered in the Uniform Commercial
20
Code
(UCC) where statutory guidelines are prescribed for

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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14. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9).
15. See Ralph C. Anzivino, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: When Is a Transaction a
Consumer Credit Transaction?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 221–29 (2012).
16. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9).
17. See Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 70–71, 432 N.W.2d 617,
619–20 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the bailment agreement at issue created a lease
agreement rather than a consumer credit sale).
18. See WIS. STAT. § 421.102 (1)–(2) (explaining that the provisions and definitions of
the WCA should be construed broadly and liberally so as to comport with the underlying
purpose of protecting consumers); see also LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d
582, 592–93, 589 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the WCA shall be read
liberally “to promote the underlying purposes of the Act and [to] look[] beyond the
transaction’s form to its substance,” and, accordingly, to include disguised transactions).
19. See WIS. STAT. § 421.102 (1)–(2) (explaining that the provisions and definitions of
the WCA should be construed broadly and liberally so as to comport with the underlying
purpose of protecting consumers); see also LeBakken, 223 Wis. 2d at 592–93 (noting that the
WCA shall be read liberally “to promote the underlying purposes of the Act and [to] look[]
beyond the transaction’s form to its substance,” and, accordingly, to include disguised
transactions).
20. See Richard L. Barnes, Distinguishing Sales and Leases: A Primer on the Scope and
Purpose of UCC Article 2A, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1995) (noting the drafters
recognition of “the confused state of the opinions dealing with the distinction between leases
and sales involving disguised security interests”); see also U.C.C. § 1–201 cmt. 37 (2012–2013)
(explaining that common law rules on disguised security interests were not sufficient to
resolve the conflict and that the 1978 Official UCC Text was an attempt to remedy this
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22

distinguishing a lease from a security interest.
One of the more difficult issues when confronted with determining
whether a transaction is a disguised consumer credit sale (subject to the
WCA) or a true lease or bailment (not subject to the WCA) is whether
the contract provides that the bailee or lessee can become the owner of
the property by paying a nominal option price either during or at the
end of the term of the contract. Wisconsin courts use four tests when
23
determining whether a customer’s option price is nominal. In Burney
v. Thorn Americas, Inc., the issue arose of “whether rent-to-own
24
contracts are consumer credit sales under the WCA.” Rent-A-Center
argued that since “the customer has no obligation to renew [under the
25
rent-to-own] agreement, there is no debt, and the WCA cannot apply.”
The court, however, noted that the WCA covers transactions where the
customer pays or agrees to pay money under the rental or bailment
26
agreement. As a result, a transaction could be a consumer credit sale
27
whether the customer has paid or agrees to pay under the agreement.
The court also addressed the applicability of the UCC to similar
28
The court concluded that the
statutory language in the WCA.
language in the UCC should not be used when interpreting the WCA
because the language used in each statute is different, and because the
UCC was primarily designed to deal with commercial transactions, not
29
consumer transactions. Further, the court noted that Wisconsin courts
use four tests when determining whether a customer’s option price is
30
Those four tests are as follows: (1) “the option price’s
nominal.
relation to the item’s fair market value”; (2) “the option price’s relation
to the total payments” under the contract; (3) “the option price’s

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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problem).
21. WIS. STAT. § 411.102 (noting that a true lease is subject to Chapter 411 of the
Wisconsin Statutes); U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. 2 (noting that a true lease is subject to Article 2A of
the UCC).
22. See WIS. STAT. § 401.203; WIS. STAT. § 409.109 (noting that a credit transaction is
subject to Chapter 409 of the Wisconsin Statutes); U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt. (noting that a credit
transaction is subject to Article 9 of the UCC).
23. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
24. Id. at 763.
25. Id. at 767.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 767–68 (discussing defendants’ attempt to analogize the WCA with the
UCC).
29. Id. at 768.
30. Id. at 770.
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31. Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d 243, 255, 510 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Ct.
App. 1993)).
32. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 668, 674 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
33. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d 243.
34. Id. at 246.
35. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 249.
38. Id. at 249–50.
39. Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted).
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
41. Id. at 253.
42. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d at 253–55 & n.8.
43. Id.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 34 Side B

relation to the original price”; and (4) whether paying the option price is
31
the most sensible alternative under the circumstances. Whether the
customer has the option to pay the option price in a lump sum payment
or installments does not affect the fact that it must be determined
32
whether the option price is nominal.
Several tests discussed in Burney were used by the court in Rent-A33
Center, Inc. v. Hall. In Hall, the customer signed a rental agreement to
34
rent a new washer and dryer on a monthly basis. Pursuant to the
agreement, the customer had “the option to purchase the appliances
after 19 months of successive renewals at [the] then fair market value
35
36
not to exceed $161.91.” The agreement also had a cap of $1643.15. In
a subsequent dispute between the parties, the merchant asserted that
the rental agreement “was not a ‘consumer credit sale’ subject to the
37
[WCA].” The court noted that there are two prerequisites that must
38
be satisfied before a lease or bailment becomes a consumer credit sale.
The customer “must have either paid or agreed to pay a sum [equal] to
39
or in excess of the . . . value of the goods.” Also, “the agreement must
provide that [the customer] . . . will become, or for no other or a
nominal consideration has the option to become, the owner of the
40
goods . . . upon full compliance with the terms of the agreement.” With
regard to the second prerequisite, the merchant asserted that the UCC,
which provides a detailed analysis to determine when a lease is intended
41
as security, should be applied by analogy to the consumer credit sale
42
The court, however, refused to apply the UCC
determination.
statutory standards to the WCA because the court believed it might
43
narrow the broad scope of the WCA. In addition, the court indicated
that the UCC statutory standards are useful when applied to large
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commercial transactions but do not apply particularly well to small
44
consumer transactions. Even though the court indicated that the UCC
statutory standards do not translate very well to small consumer
transactions, the primary means by which a bailee or lessee becomes the
owner of the goods or property are exactly the same under both the
UCC and the WCA—whether the bailee or lessee can become the
45
owner of the goods for no additional or nominal consideration.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the payment of $161.91 at the
46
end of the lease term was nominal. The court compared the amount
the lessee would have paid under the agreement for the appliances over
the term of the agreement ($1,481.42) with $161.19, which was the final
47
purchase price, and concluded it was a nominal sum. In addition, the
court noted that anyone who had already paid $1,481.42 would have “no
sensible” alternative other than to pay the option price and become the
48
As a result, the court held the rental agreement to be a
owner.
49
consumer credit sale.
The “no sensible alternative” test is further illustrated in LeBakken
50
Rent-To-Own v. Warnell. In LeBakken, a customer entered into a
51
rent-to-own agreement for a refrigerator. The agreement contained an
option price whereby the customer had the option to purchase the
52
The merchant argued that the transaction was not a
refrigerator.
consumer credit sale, but rather the agreement anticipated two
53
transactions.
The first transaction is a “true rental agreement”
between the merchant and customer, and the second transaction, if the
54
customer “exercises the option to purchase,” is a sale.
The court

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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44. Id.
45. Compare WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9) (2011–2012) (“[T]he bailee or lessee will become,
or for no other or a nominal consideration has the option to become, the owner of the goods
or real property upon full compliance with the terms of the agreement.”), with WIS. STAT.
§ 401.203(2)(d) (“The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the
lease agreement.”).
46. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d at 256.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 255–56.
50. LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 593, 589 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Ct.
App. 1998).
51. Id. at 585–86.
52. Id. at 586.
53. Id. at 590.
54. Id.
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55

disagreed with the merchant’s analysis. Rather, the court decided to
analyze the two prerequisites to a consumer credit sale when a lease or
56
bailment is involved. The first prerequisite is that the customer must
have either paid or agreed to pay a sum equal to or in excess of the
57
value of the goods. The court noted that the customer had two options
58
during the term of the rental agreement to purchase the refrigerator.
Under the first option, after one month, the customer could pay $526.95
59
for a refrigerator that was worth $551.08. Under the second option, at
the end of the lease term, if all the customer’s payments totaled
60
$1,102.15, the customer could become the owner of the refrigerator.
Under both options, it was clear to the court that the customer could
61
pay a sum equal to or in excess of the value of the goods. The first
62
prerequisite was satisfied. The second prerequisite is that the customer
has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional or
63
nominal consideration. The agreement provided that at the end of the
lease term the customer could become the owner of the refrigerator by
64
paying an additional $179.95. The court indicated that a reasonable
person “who had already paid $922.50 for a refrigerator would have ‘no
sensible alternative’ [but] to pay $179.95 [to] become the owner of the
65
Therefore, the court concluded that the option price was
goods.”
66
nominal, and the transaction was a consumer credit sale.
A lease or bailment transaction can also become a consumer credit
sale if the lessee or bailee can become the owner of the goods at the end
67
A case of no
of the agreed term for no additional consideration.
additional consideration, as opposed to nominal consideration, is
68
illustrated by Snowbank v. Bradwell.
In Snowbank, a customer

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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55. Id. (finding that the transaction was a consumer credit transaction).
56. Id. at 591.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 592.
61. Id. at 591–92.
62. Id. at 592.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 593.
66. Id.
67. Snowbank v. Bradwell, No. 2007AP2308, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 274, at *5–6 (Apr.
8, 2008).
68. Id. at *1.
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69

entered into a contract to purchase a trailer. The parties completed a
receipt indicating the buyer paid $520 down and had a balance of $89.97
70
due within seven days. The buyer took immediate possession of the
71
trailer, but the seller did not transfer title at that time. Subsequently,
the buyer did not pay the balance due, and the seller took the trailer
72
from the buyer without notice to or consent of the buyer.
In
subsequent litigation between the parties, the issue became whether the
73
transaction was a consumer credit sale.
The court noted that a
consumer credit sale includes a bailment “if the bailee . . . pays or agrees
to pay an amount . . . equivalent to or in excess of the . . . value of the
goods, and . . . for no [additional] or a nominal consideration has the
74
option to become . . . the owner of the goods.” The court concluded
75
that this transaction fell squarely within the coverage of the WCA.
The buyer had clearly taken possession of the property, which
76
constitutes a bailment. The receipt clearly indicated that the buyer had
77
a balance due to the seller. And, the buyer could become the owner of
78
the property by paying “the remainder of the balance” due.
The
79
agreement, therefore, was subject to the WCA.
Finally, the lease or bailment agreement may still qualify as a
consumer credit transaction even though the agreement includes a
termination clause in favor of the bailee or lessee, or the bailee or lessee
is not contractually required to make all the payments under the
80
contract. For example, in Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of
Milwaukee, Inc., a customer entered into a rent-to-own agreement with
a merchant for a television whereby the customer would become the

01/13/2014 11:22:05

C M
Y K

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 36 Side A

69. Id. at *1–2.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *4–5 (explaining that the question of whether the agreement at issue was a
consumer credit transaction “is a mixed question of fact and law” (citing LeBakken Rent-ToOwn v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 589, 589 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Ct. App. 1998))).
74. Id. at *5–6 (quoting Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123
Wis. 2d 79, 84, 365 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Ct. App. 1985)).
75. Snowbank, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 274, at *6.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 79, 81, 88,
365 N.W.2d 882, 884, 887 (Ct. App. 1985).
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81. Id. at 81.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 85.
84. Id.
85. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9) (2011–2012); see also Palacios, 123 Wis. 2d at 87 (citing WIS.
STAT. § 421.301(9)).
86. Palacios, 123 Wis. 2d at 87–88.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id.
89. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9).

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 36 Side B

owner of the goods after making seventy-eight consecutive weekly
81
payments of $23 per week.
The lease agreement contained a
82
termination clause. When litigation ensued between the parties, the
merchant argued that the transaction was not covered by the WCA
83
because it was not a consumer credit sale. Essentially the merchant’s
argument was that there was no consumer credit transaction because the
customer was not obligated by the lease agreement to make installment
84
The court, however, had a different view. The court
payments.
reasoned that a consumer credit transaction occurs when a “debt is
85
payable in installments or a finance charge is imposed.” The lease
agreement between the parties did include a time-price differential (the
difference between the cash sales price and the total price through the
86
installments), and as such, qualified as a consumer credit transaction.
Therefore, the court held that there is no requirement that there be an
obligation to make payments in order for a transaction to qualify as a
87
consumer credit sale. The rental agreement was held to be a consumer
88
credit sale.
If the intent of the legislature was to increase the protection of the
WCA by including all leases and bailments disguised as sales into the
definition of consumer credit sales, the legislature significantly missed
the mark. The only lease or bailment that falls within the definition of a
consumer credit sale is one where the bailee or lessee will become or has
the option to become the owner of the bailed or leased item for no
89
additional or nominal consideration. What about the lease or bailment
that contains an option price that is not a nominal one, but yet the
economics of the transaction are such that exercising the option is the
only reasonable decision? The proposed transaction is clearly not a true
bailment or lease but rather a disguised sale. These cases are entirely
missed by the WCA’s definition of a consumer credit sale. For example,
in In re Grubbs Construction Co., Grubbs entered into a Master Lease
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Agreement for the lease of several pieces of equipment, and during
Grubbs’ Chapter 11 bankruptcy case it became important to determine
90
if the leases were true leases or disguised sales. Four of the leases
91
contained “Early Buyout Options” that Grubbs could exercise. There
92
were actually three options that were available to Grubbs. The first
option, which was available upon the sixty-sixth month of the lease,
provided for an option price of $163,327.50, which together with the
93
prior monthly lease payments, would total $637,687.32. The second
option, which was available upon the seventy-second month of the lease,
provided for an option price of $131,250.00, which together with the
94
prior monthly lease payments, would total $648,733.44. And finally,
the third option was to renew the leases at the end of the lease term for
an additional fourteen months at a cost of $134,020.32, which would
95
result in total lease payments of $659,020.32. Clearly, none of the
option prices were nominal since they ranged from a low of $131,250.00
to a high of $163,327.50. Based on the economics of the transaction, the
court reasoned that Grubbs had no choice but to purchase the
96
equipment. As a result, the court concluded that the lease agreements
97
were in fact disguised sales, not true leases. Obviously the Grubbs
transaction is not a consumer transaction, but the point is that not all
disguised consumer credit sales are anticipated by the nominal
consideration standard. In those consumer cases where the option price
is not nominal, the courts will need to consider the economic realities of
the transaction as the court did in Grubbs to catch all the disguised
consumer credit sale transactions.

98

A consumer credit transaction also includes consumer leases. A
consumer lease is “a lease of goods [by] a merchant . . . to a customer for
99
a term exceeding 4 months.” A consumer lease does not include a

C M
Y K

In re Grubbs Constr. Co., 319 B.R. 698, 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 724.
WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2011–2012).
Id. § 421.301(11).
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100. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.05 (July 2007).
101. Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS 202, at *4 (Feb. 22,
1994).
102. Id. at *4–6.
103. Id. at *2.
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *1–2.
106. Id. at *2–3.
107. Id. at *3 (explaining that Badger argued that the lease was a “commercial lease” not
subject to the WCA).
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id.
110. See id. at *4–6 (discussing considerations taken into account by the trial court).
111. Id. at *4.
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lease of real property.
There are a number of issues that arise under the WCA’s definition
of consumer leases. First, it must be determined whether the lease is a
consumer or commercial lease. A recital in the lease that the lease is a
101
commercial or business lease is not controlling.
Rather, the courts
102
consider a number of factors in reaching a determination. Second, if
the lessee has the option to purchase the goods at any time, does the
option convert the lease into one for a term less than four months?
And, third, for leases that are expressly agreed to be less than four
months, if the lessee’s payments actually exceed four months, does that
fact convert the lease into one for a term greater than four months?
The leading case addressing the distinction between a commercial or
103
In
business lease and a consumer lease is Duston v. Badger Lease.
104
The lease
Duston, a customer leased a used car from a merchant.
agreement required the customer to make forty-two bi-weekly payments
of $50, and after the forty-two payments were made, the customer could
105
Subsequently, the merchant
purchase the car for an additional $4.
repossessed the car without complying with the WCA’s statutory
106
requirements. When litigation ensued, the issue before the court was
107
whether the car lease was a commercial or consumer lease. The lease
specifically provided that the car should be used solely in the conduct of
108
the lessee’s business. Based on that contract language, the merchant
argued that “the lease was unambiguous and must be read as a
109
commercial lease.” The trial court, however, did not rely on the recital
in the lease but rather analyzed a number of factors in reaching its
110
decision. First, the court noted that the lease was titled “Equipment
111
Lease.” Second, the lease did not state whether it was a commercial or
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112. Id.
113. Id. at *5.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *6.
118. LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 589, 589 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Ct.
App. 1998).
119. Id. at 585–86.
120. Id. at 590 (explaining that the merchant claimed compliance with the WCA was not
required because the agreement was not a consumer credit transaction, which includes within
its definition a “consumer lease” (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10))).
121. Id. at 594.
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consumer lease. Third, the evidence indicated that the consumer had
told the merchant at the time of contracting that she wanted to use the
113
car to visit her sister. Fourth, the address of the customer on the lease
114
agreement was the customer’s home address, not a business address.
Fifth, the evidence indicated that the merchant knew at the time of
contracting that the customer was not going to use the vehicle in her
course of employment, but rather simply to commute to her place of
115
employment. And finally, the court noted that in cases of ambiguity,
the court should construe the document against the drafter, which was
116
the merchant. As a result of those factors, the court held that despite
the contract recital, the lease was a consumer lease and the merchant
should have followed the WCA’s procedures when the merchant
117
repossessed the vehicle.
The WCA requirement that the lease exceed four months has
created a couple of interesting issues. First, if the lease grants the lessee
the option to purchase the goods at any time, does that convert the lease
into a term for less than four months? Second, if the lease is for an
expressed term less than four months, but payments actually exceed the
four-month period, does that convert the lease into one for a term
greater than four months? The option to purchase issue was addressed
118
In LeBakken, a customer
in LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell.
119
entered into a lease transaction with a merchant.
In subsequent
litigation between the parties, the issue became whether the lease
between the parties was a consumer lease for a term exceeding four
120
The merchant argued that “the lease was not for a period
months.
exceeding four months because [the customer] could exercise
121
[an] . . . option [to] purchase the refrigerator” prior to that time. The
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122. Id. at 594 n.8.
123. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.103(2)).
124. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 411.103(1)(j)).
125. Id. at 594–95.
126. Id. at 594.
127. Id. at 595.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Ron Jensen Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. Poulton, No. 92-1770, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS
82, at *2 (Jan. 26, 1993).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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court first noted that the term “lease” is not defined by the WCA. The
court further noted that the WCA provides that if it does not define a
123
term, that term shall have the meaning given to it in the UCC.
Therefore, the court adopted the definition of a lease under Chapter 411
of the Wisconsin Statutes, which provides that “a lease is a transfer of
the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for
124
Next, the court addressed whether the consumer’s
consideration.”
contractual right to purchase the refrigerator prior to the end of the
125
four-month period disqualified the lease from being a consumer lease.
The court noted that the customer had the right under the lease to use
126
the refrigerator for up to twenty months. The merchant, on the other
hand, “could only terminate the [lease] if [the customer] did not make
127
Therefore, the
his payments or otherwise breached the agreement.”
court reasoned that the merchant was bound to the lease agreement for
128
twenty months unless the customer breached the agreement.
Based
on those facts, the court held that the merchant’s lease to the customer
129
was for a term that exceeded four months.
The issue of whether a lease for less than four months is converted
into one for greater than four months when the payments extend
beyond the agreed payment period was addressed in Ron Jensen
130
Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. Poulton. In Ron Jensen, a consumer leased an
automobile for ninety days, but the payments actually exceeded the
131
four-month period.
The court, however, held that the fact that the
payments exceeded the four-month period did not cause the lease to be
132
subject to the WCA. The court reasoned that the fact that the lessee’s
payments exceeded the four-month period was “analogous to . . . a
133
tenant who holds over beyond the expiration of [a] lease.” The tenant
holdover does not extend the term of the lease, nor did the late
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payments extend the term of the auto lease.

C. Open-End Credit Plan
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134. Id.
135. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2011–2012).
136. Id.
137. Id. (defining credit and open-end credit transactions as consumer credit
transactions, while a cash transaction is not defined as such).
138. See id. § 422.308(1) (setting forth numerous disclosure requirements for open-end
credit transactions).
139. Id. § 421.301(10).
140. Id. § 421.301(27)(a).
141. Id. § 421.301(27)(c).
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There are actually three types of transactions that can occur when a
customer owes money to a merchant. The transaction could be one that
was anticipated to be a cash transaction, but the customer did not pay as
135
agreed; the transaction could be a simple credit transaction; or the
136
transaction could be one that arose from an open-end credit plan. The
credit and open-end credit transactions are subject to the WCA while
137
the cash transaction is not.
It is important to distinguish the simple
credit transaction from the open-end credit transaction because the
open-end credit transaction has more disclosure requirements and those
138
enhanced disclosures must occur prior to contracting.
An open-end credit plan is one of the specified types of a consumer
139
An open-end credit plan is “consumer credit
credit transaction.
extended on an account pursuant to a plan under which” all of the
following apply: (1) “[t]he creditor . . . permit[s] the customer to make
purchases or obtain loans, from time to time, directly from the creditor
or indirectly by use of a credit card, check or other device, as the plan
may provide;” (2) the customer may “[pay] the balance in full or in
installments;” (3) “[a] finance charge may be computed by the creditor
from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance;” and (4) “[t]he
creditor has treated the transaction as open-end consumer credit for
purposes of any disclosures required under the federal consumer credit
140
A credit plan will “not be considered an open-end
protection act.”
credit plan, even though it [otherwise] meets the criteria” for an openend credit plan, if the creditor treats the transaction as an ordinary
141
credit transaction.
“In order to obligate a [customer for any liability] arising out of an
open-end credit plan, the merchant must . . . obtain the signature of [the
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customer] on the writing evidencing the consumer credit transaction.”
143
The signature requirement can be accomplished in one of three ways.
First, the customer can sign the “open-end credit agreement setting
forth all of the terms of the . . . plan including the [required] credit
144
disclosures.” Second, the customer can sign
[a] credit application which expressly states that each [customer]
signing the application will be obligated according to the terms of
the open-end credit agreement . . . provided the creditor mails or
delivers to each customer who signs the application a copy of the
open-end credit agreement before that customer makes any
145
charges on the account.
Or, third, the customer signs
[a] transaction receipt which expressly states that each
[customer] signing the receipt will be obligated according to the
terms of the open-end credit agreement . . . provided the creditor
has mailed or delivered a copy of the open-end credit agreement
to that customer before that customer makes any charges on the
146
account.
The critical factor when distinguishing between an open-end credit
plan and an ordinary credit transaction is the creditor’s conduct when
the debt is not paid in full.

The traditional open-end credit plan is illustrated by Patzka v. Viterbo

WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.351 (July 2007).
See id. § 1.351(1)–(3).
Id. § 1.351(1).
Id. § 1.351(2).
Id. § 1.351(3).
Id. § 1.07.
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144.
145.
146.
147.
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[W]hen a merchant’s billings are not paid in full within a
stipulated time period and . . . the merchant does not, in fact,
regard such accounts [to be] in default (For example, by
customarily failing to institute collection activity or by continuing
to extend credit) and imposes charges periodically for [the]
delay[ed] payment of such accounts . . . until paid [in full], the
charge so imposed [is] . . . a finance charge and the credit so
extended comes within the definition of [an] open-end credit
147
[plan].
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148

College.
In Patzka, a student received a loan from a college for
149
tuition. At the time of her registration, the college did not provide any
150
information regarding the terms of her loan. In subsequent litigation
between the parties, both parties agreed that her financial arrangement
151
with the college was an open-end credit plan.
The test used by the courts when distinguishing an open-end credit
152
plan from an ordinary credit transaction is an objective one.
In
DeGrave v. Door County Cooperative, customers were members of a co153
op and periodically made purchases for their farm on credit. The coop’s invoices provided that all purchases were due within the following
month and that a finance charge of 1.5% per month would be assessed
154
on the outstanding balance less credits and payments. When litigation
ensued between the parties, the issue became whether the transaction
was an open-end credit plan subject to enhanced disclosures prior to
155
contracting. The court noted that in order to qualify as an open-end
156
credit plan, the co-op’s plan must satisfy four required elements. The
co-op asserted that one element was missing in that the co-op never
extended the privilege of paying the balance in installments to the
157
The narrow issue before the court was whether the
customers.
agreement between the parties permitted the customers to pay in
158
installments. The court used an objective test and inquired whether “a
reasonable person reading [the] terms could believe [that] the co-op
159
permitted payments after the due date.” The court concluded that the
terms contained in the co-op’s invoices impliedly permitted the member
to pay in installments, and the only consequence of such payments after
160
the due date would be the imposition of a finance charge. Thus, the

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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148. Patzka v. Viterbo Coll., 917 F. Supp. 654, 659 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
149. Id. at 657.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 659.
152. DeGrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1607, at *7
(Dec. 17, 1996).
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *1 (explaining that the customers alleged that the merchant violated the
WCA by charging interest and repossessing the customers’ stock and dividends).
156. Id. at *5.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *7.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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161. Id. at *7–8 (holding that “the transactions constituted an open-end credit plan”).
162. See Huser Implement, Inc. v. Wendt, No. 98-1066-FT, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS
1136, at *7 (Oct. 1, 1998) (holding that “the parties did not have an open-ended credit plan”).
163. Id. at *1–2.
164. Id. at *2.
165. Id. at *6.
166. Id. at *7.
167. Id.
168. See Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS
581, at **13 (June 18, 2003) (agreeing with the trial court in holding that the transaction that
took place was a cash transaction and did not constitute a credit transaction).
169. Id. at **2.
170. Id.
171. Id. at **12 (explaining that the customers argued that the transaction was an “open-
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transaction was an open-end credit plan and subject to the WCA.
Application of the objective test has resulted in courts finding that
the parties’ relationship was simply an ordinary credit transaction and
162
not an open-end credit plan.
In Huser Implement, Inc. v. Wendt, a
customer “purchased a four-wheel-drive . . . tractor and some other farm
machinery from [the merchant] . . . with financing from John Deere
163
Credit Services.” For several years, the merchant extended credit to
the customer for other goods and services and imposed a finance charge
on the customer on the unpaid balance from time to time, but did not
164
disclose the percentage rate charged. When litigation ensued between
the parties, the customer claimed that the merchant violated the WCA
by failing to provide the necessary disclosures pursuant to an open-end
165
The merchant “dispute[d] that the parties had an opencredit plan.
end credit plan,” and instead characterized their relationship as an
166
“ordinary credit transaction[].” The court concluded that the parties
did not have an open-end credit plan because the merchant “billed [the
customer] on monthly invoices for all goods and services provided
167
and . . . no written credit plan existed” between the parties.
Finally, the objective test has been used by courts to find that a
168
transaction was a cash transaction and not a credit transaction.
In
Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, the customers entered into a contract
169
for the installation of two fireplaces.
Financing terms were never
discussed, and the contracts signed by the customers indicated that
payment was to be made “net 30 days [with a 1.5%] monthly service
170
When litigation ensued between the
charge for overdue invoices.”
parties, the issue became whether the customers had an open-end credit
171
plan. The court noted that the 1.5% service charge was imposed for
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late payments, and also that the merchant viewed the account to be in
173
default. Further, the court concluded that the customers did not have
“the privilege of paying the balance in full or in installments,” but rather
174
“payment was required [to be made] in full within thirty days.” As a
result of the foregoing, the court concluded that the transaction was not
175
a consumer credit transaction subject to the WCA.
II. WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT EXCLUSIONS
A. In General
176

There are ten enumerated exclusions in the WCA. The WCA does
177
not apply to extensions of credit to organizations or to transactions in
178
which all parties to the transaction are organizations. The WCA does
not apply to motor vehicle leases unless the lease is for personal, family,
179
household, or agricultural use. For a mixed-use vehicle, 50% or more
of the use must be for personal, family, household, agricultural use, or
180
some combination thereof.
There are also specified exclusions for
181
182
transactions involving public utilities, common carriers, electric
183
184
185
cooperatives, pawnbrokers, the sale of insurance, and the sale of
186
securities.
The WCA states that it does not apply to transactions that are
187
primarily for an agricultural purpose, but that can be misleading. The

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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end credit plan”).
172. Id. at **11.
173. Id.
174. Id. at **12.
175. Id. at **13.
176. WIS. STAT. § 421.202 (2011–2012).
177. See WIS. STAT. § 421.202(1); see also WIS. STAT. § 421.301(28) (“‘Organization[s]’
[include] a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate,
limited liability company, partnership, cooperative or association other than a cooperative
organized under ch. 185 or 193 which has gross annual revenues not exceeding $5 million.”).
178. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(2).
179. Id. § 421.202(9).
180. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DFI-WCA 1.06 (July 2007).
181. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(3).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 421.202(4).
185. Id. § 421.202(5).
186. Id. § 421.202(8).
187. Id. § 421.202(10).
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WCA debt collection provisions in Chapter 427 do apply to transactions
188
that are for an agricultural purpose.
Also, any motor vehicle leased
189
And finally, any
for an agricultural purpose is subject to the WCA.
credit transaction that is primarily for an agricultural purpose is subject
to section 422.210, which states that a creditor must clearly disclose in
writing any finance charge or fee to be able to collect the charge or
190
fee.
B. The $25,000 Cap
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188. Id.
189. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421.301(25m), 429.104(9).
190. WIS. STAT. §§ 421.202(10), 422.210(1).
191. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
192. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Geiger, 118 Wis. 2d 140, 145, 345 N.W.2d 527, 529–30
(Ct. App. 1984).
193. Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 455–56, 485 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Ct. App.
1992).
194. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6); Valley W. Bank v. Bennett, No. 85-1816, 1986 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 3865, at *2 (Sept. 9, 1986).
195. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(5)(a).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 421.301(5)(b).
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Certain other consumer transactions are also excluded from
coverage under the WCA. There are three consumer transactions that
191
exceed $25,000 that are excluded from WCA coverage.
The theory
underlying the $25,000 exclusion is that “consumers entering
transactions involving $25,000 or less” need the protection of the WCA,
but that “consumers entering transactions involving larger amounts
192
are . . . able to protect themselves.” However, in those cases where the
transaction exceeds $25,000, the lender can opt to provide WCA
193
protections.
The first $25,000 exclusion is any consumer credit transaction where
194
the “amount financed” is greater than $25,000. The amount financed
is a different amount depending upon whether the consumer credit
transaction is a consumer credit sale or a consumer loan. For a
consumer credit sale, the amount financed is the cash price of the real or
195
personal property or services, less the amount of any down payment
196
whether made in cash or in property traded in, plus the “amount
actually paid or to be paid by the creditor pursuant to an agreement
with the customer to discharge a security interest in or a lien on [the]
197
For a consumer loan, the
property traded in” by the customer.
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198. Id. § 421.301(5)(a).
199. Id. § 421.301(5)(c)1.
200. Id. § 421.301(5)(c)2.
201. Id. § 421.301(5)(c)3.
202. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 773–76 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
203. Id. at 763.
204. Id. at 773.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 773 (noting that to calculate the precise amount of damages it is first
necessary to determine what the finance charge was in the transactions).
207. Id. at 774.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 775.
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amount financed is the amount paid to or receivable by the customer or
198
another person on the customer’s behalf.
To the extent that the
charges are not already included in the prior amounts, the amount
financed for both consumer credit sales and consumer loans should also
199
include any taxes, any amounts paid or to be paid by the creditor for
200
registration, certificate of title or license fees, and any other charges
201
permitted under section 422.202.
As noted above, the amount financed includes additional charges,
but not finance charges. Therefore, it is very important to distinguish
the two different types of charges. In Burney v. Thorn Americas, Inc.,
the court had to calculate the amount financed and also to distinguish
202
additional charges from finance charges. In Burney, the court was first
faced with the issue of whether rent-to-own transactions were consumer
203
credit sales under the WCA.
After the court concluded that the
transactions were covered by the WCA, the court held that Rent-A204
Center had violated the WCA and must pay damages.
The damage
calculation under the WCA required the court to calculate the finance
205
charges in the transaction. The larger the finance charges, the larger
206
the damages payable by Rent-A-Center.
In its effort to reduce the
calculation of finance charges, Rent-A-Center argued that it provides
various services to its customers (delivery, maintenance, and
terminability), whose costs should have been included in the amount
207
The court
financed, and not treated as part of the finance charges.
noted that “a finance charge [is] any charge that is a condition of the
208
extension of credit.”
On the other hand, the amount financed for a
consumer credit sale is the cash price plus other allowable additional
209
charges. As a result, the court concluded that if a customer “can buy
the service by paying cash,” the item is properly a part of the amount
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 775–76.
Id. at 775.
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id.
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211.
212.
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financed; whereas “if [the] service is available only to those [paying]
210
over time,” the cost should be “part of the finance charge.” Further,
the court indicated that “[f]or an additional charge to be part of the
amount financed, the customer must have the [opportunity] to refuse
211
the service.” Thus, “[i]f the customer . . . has no alternative but to take
the additional service and pay the additional cost, such a charge is a
212
condition of the extension of credit and [thereby a] finance charge.”
Both parties in Burney agreed that the retail price of the item being
213
sold was part of the amount financed.
They disagreed on the
treatment of delivery charges, maintenance, and terminability. Rent-ACenter argued that the cost of delivery should be added to the amount
214
financed. However, the court concluded that Rent-A-Center factored
the cost of delivery into every retail price, and as such, it would be
215
double counting to add it to the amount financed.
Rent-A-Center
216
made a similar argument with regard to its maintenance costs.
However, the court reasoned that the maintenance service is not an
extra service for sale for cash, and as such, could not be added to the
217
amount financed. Finally, the court analyzed the cost of terminability.
Terminability is the cost associated with permitting the customers to
218
return goods without penalty at the end of any period. Rent-A-Center
argued that the cost of terminability should not be part of the finance
charge because it is a cost incurred when goods are returned and credit
219
220
The court disagreed.
The court
is not extended to a customer.
reasoned that the cost of terminability is the price the customer pays for
not buying an item outright, and as such, is the equivalent of interest,
221
which is akin to a finance charge. Further, the costs of terminability
only arise when an item is purchased over time as opposed to an
222
outright cash sale.
Thus, the court concluded that the “amount
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financed include[d] only the retail price” of each item.
Once the amount financed is determined by the court on a single
loan, it is a simple matter to decide if that amount is greater than
224
$25,000, and if so, the transaction is not subject to the WCA.
However, perplexing issues arise when there is more than one loan or
advance between the parties. In In re Ingersoll, Mr. Ingersoll obtained
loans from a number of banks while engaged in sod farming and other
225
During Mr. Ingersoll’s subsequent bankruptcy, the
businesses.
applicability of the WCA to Mr. Ingersoll’s numerous loans became an
226
issue. Mr. Ingersoll procured the loans as an individual, but there was
227
a dispute as to the nature of the loans. The court ruled that the loans
procured for commercial or business purposes were not subject to the
228
WCA, but those procured for an agricultural purpose were subject to
229
the WCA. Specifically, the court held that the Ixonia bank loans were
230
consumer credit transactions within the purview of the WCA.
Although the Ixonia loan balance was approximately $140,000, the
advances comprising that amount “were made at various times [and] in
231
varying amounts.” Only one advance, however, was in an amount of
232
less than $25,000. For that advance, the court held that the WCA was
233
applicable. For those advances in excess of the $25,000 exclusion, the
234
court concluded that the WCA was not applicable.
Despite the $25,000 exclusion, advances in excess of $25,000 can
become subject to the WCA either by express statement or implication.
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223. Id.
224. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs v. Sawyer, No. 2006AP1829, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 900,
at *5 (Oct. 16, 2007); Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma, 192 Wis. 2d 576, 604 n.13, 532
N.W.2d 456, 467 n.13 (Ct. App. 1995); Meas v. Young, 142 Wis. 2d 95, 107, 417 N.W.2d 55, 59
(Ct. App. 1987); First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Sheboygan v. Kielisch, No. 86-2334, 1987 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 4151, at *3 (Oct. 14, 1987); Valley W. Bank v. Bennett, No. 85-1816, 1986 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 3865, at *2 (Sept. 9, 1986).
225. Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 914 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1981).
226. Id. at 916.
227. Id.
228. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(10) (2011–2012); see also 1997 Wis. Act 302 (restricting the
WCA coverage for agricultural transactions to more limited requirements under the WCA).
229. Ingersoll, 8 B.R. at 916.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 916–17.
233. Id. at 917.
234. Id.
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Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 447, 485 N.W.2d 426, 428–29 (Ct. App.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447–49.
Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 456–57.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 459–61.
WIS. STAT. § 421.301(17) (2011–2012).
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1992).
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237.
238.
239.
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241.
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245.
246.
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In Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, the debtors executed a Consumer Real
Estate Security Agreement (CRESA) in 1979 that secured the original
loan and granted the Bank of Barron a continuing lien on the debtors’
235
real property for any credit granted in the future. In 1986, the debtors
236
executed a second mortgage to a second lender.
After the second
mortgage was recorded, the Bank of Barron made a series of five
237
advances to the debtors. Two of the advances exceeded the $25,000
238
cap and the other three did not. For the two advances that exceeded
the $25,000 cap, the second mortgage holder argued that those advances
could not relate back to the 1979 CRESA because the WCA does not
239
The court reasoned,
apply to transactions that exceed $25,000.
however, that a security agreement containing a future advance clause
240
In the court’s
should be given effect according to its own terms.
opinion, the security agreement was clear that the lien on their property
241
would secure all current and future debt between the parties. Further,
242
the security agreement did not limit future advances to $25,000 or less.
Therefore, the court held that the Bank of Barron had opted for WCA
coverage for the one advance that exceeded the $25,000 cap where the
loan documents evidencing the advance referred back to the 1979
243
CRESA. The simple reference to the CRESA in the loan documents
was deemed sufficient to cause WCA coverage despite the WCA
244
exclusion. As a result, the advance related back to the priority date of
245
the CRESA and was superior to the second lender. The WCA does
expressly provide that a merchant can agree to be covered by the WCA
246
when a transaction is not otherwise subject to the WCA. Apparently,
a lender’s agreement can be inferred by the simple use of the CRESA
loan documents.
However, Bank of Barron indicates that the opposite can also
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247. See Bank of Barron, 169 Wis. 2d at 458–59.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 459.
251. Id.
252. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6) (2011–2012).
253. Id. § 429.104(9); see also discussion supra Part I.B.
254. Wehrenberg v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 01-0985, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS
24, at *4–5 (Jan. 10, 2002).
255. Id. at *4.
256. Id.
257. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
258. WIS. STAT. § 429.104(9).
259. Id. §§ 421.301(43m), 429.104(6) (defining capitalized costs).
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occur.
Another advance by the Bank of Barron also exceeded the
$25,000 cap, but the loan documents evidencing this advance were
248
prepared in a different fashion. The loan documents for this advance
specifically provided that it was “not governed by the Wisconsin
249
Consumer Act.” As a result, the court concluded that the lender did
250
not opt into WCA coverage. Thus, the advance did not relate back to
the 1979 CRESA priority date, and as a result, was ruled subordinate to
251
the second mortgage holder.
Obviously, great care should be taken
when using CRESA forms and non-CRESA forms when documenting
advances.
The second exclusion that involves the $25,000 cap is a motor vehicle
252
A
consumer lease where the total lease obligation exceeds $25,000.
“motor vehicle consumer lease” is a lease entered into in Wisconsin by a
natural person primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural
253
purposes for a period of time exceeding four months. In Wehrenberg
v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., Wehrenberg signed a consumer lease in
254
California while she was a Wisconsin resident.
Wehrenberg argued
that her lease “was entered into in Wisconsin because she considered
Wisconsin to be her primary and permanent residence when she signed
255
256
The court did not agree with her interpretation.
The
the lease.”
court reasoned that her “subjective belief that Wisconsin was her
permanent residence [did] not transform a lease she signed in
California, on which she listed a California address, into a lease entered
257
into in . . . Wisconsin.”
258
Further, the $25,000 cap applies to the “total lease obligation.”
The total lease obligation is the sum of all scheduled payments under
259
the lease, plus any capitalized costs. An illustration of the calculation
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is provided in Raneda v. Bank of America, N.A.
In Raneda, a
customer leased an SUV, and under the terms of the lease the customer
261
was required to pay thirty-nine payments of $733.91.
Upon
nonpayment by the customer, the car was repossessed, and the customer
262
alleged that the repossession action violated the WCA.
The issue
before the court was whether the total lease obligation exceeded the
263
The customer argued that the total lease obligation is
$25,000 cap.
calculated by looking at “the value of the vehicle at the beginning of the
lease [term] . . . minus the option to purchase at the end of the lease
264
[term].” Applying that formula, the value of the vehicle would have
265
been valued at just under $16,000 and subject to the WCA. The court,
however, disagreed with the customer’s method of calculating the total
266
lease obligation. Rather, the court concluded that “[a]ccording to the
WCA, [the] total lease obligation for a motor vehicle consumer lease
is . . . the sum of all [the] scheduled periodic payments under the lease
267
Under that formula, the total lease
plus the down payment.”
268
obligation was $28,622.49.
As a result, the court concluded that the
269
motor vehicle consumer lease was not subject to the WCA.
The third exclusion that involves the $25,000 cap is “[any] other
270
An
consumer transaction[]” where the cash price exceeds $25,000.
interesting issue that the courts have faced is when there are multiple
debts owed by the consumer, should each debt be considered separately,
or should the debts be combined and considered as one larger debt for
cap purposes? In Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hospital, the debtors owed
271
$27,051.65 to the hospital for two hospitalizations. The hospital filed a
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260. Raneda v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 02-2149, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 616, at **12–13
(July 1, 2003).
261. Id. at **13.
262. Id. at **12–13.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at **13.
267. Id.; see also WIS. STAT. §§ 421.301(43m), 429.104(26) (2011–2012) (internal
quotations omitted).
268. Raneda, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 616, at **13.
269. Id. at **12.
270. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
271. Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425, 447, 597 N.W.2d 462, 474 (Ct. App.
1999).
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272

hospital lien against the Dorrs, and the Dorrs claimed that such
273
activity was a violation of the WCA. The hospital combined the two
274
As a
charges into a single charge, which exceeded the $25,000 cap.
result, the hospital asserted that the matter fell within the WCA’s
275
276
exclusionary clause.
Each individual claim was less than $25,000.
The issue before the court was whether the claims could be combined
into a single claim, or whether they should be treated as individual
277
The court noted that “[t]he evidence before the court was
claims.
insufficient to determine whether the two hospitalizations represent[ed]
278
The
a single transaction or [were distinctly] separate transactions.”
court noted that “[i]f the [debtors could] demonstrate that the
hospitalizations [were] separate and independent transactions under the
[WCA], each claim must be treated independently and both [claims
279
would be] under the statutory maximum.” Similarly, where multiple
notes exist between the debtor and creditor, each individual note will be
considered separate from the other notes and not combined for a total
280
debt that could exceed the $25,000 limit.
In addition to the multiple claims issue, there is also some
disagreement over the type of consumer transactions covered by this
281
For example, the treatment of consumer
third exclusionary clause.
leases for property, other than motor vehicles (which clearly fall within
the coverage of the second exclusionary clause), has led to conflicting
results. In American Industrial Leasing Co. v. Geiger, American
Industrial leased two tractors to the Geigers for a term of sixty months
with a monthly payment of $816.31 for a total lease obligation of
282
283
American had purchased the two tractors for $29,050.
$48,978.60.
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272. Id. at 430.
273. Id. at 447.
274. Id. at 447–48.
275. Id. at 447.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 448.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 448–49.
280. Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916–17 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1981).
281. Compare discussion infra notes 282–94 and accompanying text, with discussion infra
notes 295–304 and accompanying text.
282. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Geiger, 118 Wis. 2d 140, 142, 345 N.W.2d 527, 528 (Ct.
App. 1984).
283. Id.
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Id. at 144–45.
Id.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 144, 146.
Id. at 146.
See id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 432 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App.
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1988).
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Upon the Geigers’ default, litigation ensued between the parties, and
the Geigers argued that the WCA exclusions did not apply to consumer
284
leases. In other words, the Geigers proposed that all consumer leases
285
were subject to WCA. The court noted that the Geigers’ lease was a
consumer credit transaction and as such was a consumer transaction
286
subject to the WCA. The issue, however, was whether the transaction
was subject to one of the $25,000 exclusionary clauses provided in the
287
WCA.
The Geigers argued that because the first exclusionary rule
defines amount financed in terms of consumer credit sales and consumer
loans, and the third exclusionary rule in terms of cash price, the
legislature must have intended consumer leases not to be included in the
288
exclusionary clauses. The court, however, disagreed with the Geigers’
289
The court reasoned that the purpose
interpretation of the WCA.
behind the $25,000 exclusion is that transactions under $25,000 should
be given protection under the WCA, but the transactions over $25,000
290
Therefore, the court
will likely involve the assistance of counsel.
concluded it would be logical to apply the $25,000 exclusion to all
291
consumer transactions, including consumer leases. The court chose to
apply the first exclusionary clause and proceeded to determine the
292
amount financed under the lease. The court reasoned that the amount
293
financed is that amount to which an interest rate is charged. The court
held the amount financed was the purchase price by American, or
$29,050, and as a result, the WCA was not applicable to the
294
transaction.
A contrary analysis is presented in American Industrial Leasing Co.
295
v. Moderow. In Moderow, the Moderows agreed to make eighty-four
lease payments of $619.22 ($52,014.48) to American for a mono-slope
hog confinement building that was to be placed on the Moderows’
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296. Id. at 65.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 66; see also 1997 Wis. Act 302 (restricting the WCA coverage for agricultural
transactions such that transactions like the Moderows’ lease are subject to more limited
requirements under the WCA); WIS. STAT. § 421.202(10) (2011–2012).
302. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d at 67.
303. Id. at 69.
304. Id.
305. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
306. Id.
307. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d at 70–71.
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property. American bought the building for $25,100 for the purpose
297
of leasing it to the Moderows. The “lease provided that [the] title to
the building would remain with American and . . . the building would be
298
The
returned to American [at the] expiration of the lease [term].”
lease agreement required the Moderows to pay three monthly payments
299
($1,857.66) prior to installing the building on their property.
The
initial payment was applied toward satisfaction of the Moderows’
300
obligation. Thereafter, when litigation ensued, the Moderows argued
301
that the WCA applied to their transaction. Specifically, they asserted
that the transaction was less than $25,000 because the cash price for the
building ($25,100) less the initial payment ($1,857.66) resulted in a
302
The court, however, concluded that the
$23,242.34 transaction.
$25,100 figure was the cash price for the building, and the initial
payment of the three installment payments of the eighty-four month
agreement was not a “down payment” intended to reduce the purchase
303
price. Therefore, the cash price exceeded the $25,000 limit of the Act
304
and was excluded.
The concept of cash price appears in both the first and third
305
In the first exclusionary clause, the concept
exclusionary clause.
appears in the definition of amount financed, but only with reference to
306
The Moderow court clearly held that the
consumer credit sales.
consumer lease in Moderow was not a consumer credit sale, and no
307
mention was ever made of the lease qualifying as a consumer loan.
Therefore, the only exclusionary rule that the Moderow court could
have been applying that contains the concept of cash price is the third
exclusionary rule.
The Moderow and Geiger cases raise two interesting issues. First,
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308. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
309. See Anzivino, discussion supra note 15, at 205, 218, 220–21, 236.
310. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10).
311. Id. § 421.301(9).
312. Id. § 421.301(11).
313. Id. § 421.301(12).
314. Id. § 421.301(10)–(11).
315. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 65–66, 432 N.W.2d 617, 618
(Ct. App. 1988).
316. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.05 (July 2007).
317. WIS. STAT. § 402.107(2); see also id. § 402.107(1) (noting that section 402.107(1)
applies only to contracts for the sale of a structure to be removed from the realty and as such,
contemplates a building that is already affixed to real estate and is to be removed).
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for consumer leases (other than motor vehicle leases consumer leases
that are covered by the second exclusionary clause), is the first or third
exclusionary clause the correct one to apply? The answer will depend
upon the subject matter of the consumer lease.
The first exclusionary clause applies to “[c]onsumer credit
308
transactions” in which the amount financed exceeds $25,000.
309
“Consumer credit transaction” is a very broad term and specifically
includes consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer leases, and
310
A consumer credit
transactions pursuant to open-end credit plans.
311
312
313
sale, consumer lease, and consumer loan are three separate and
distinct types of consumer credit transactions. They are mutually
exclusive terms. In other words, a consumer credit sale is neither a
consumer lease nor a consumer loan, and vice versa.
The consumer lease included within the definition of consumer
314
credit transaction is a consumer lease of goods, not real property.
Therefore, the Geiger transaction, which involved the lease of two
tractors, is a consumer lease, not a consumer credit sale or a consumer
loan.
The Moderow transaction, on the other hand, involved the lease of a
315
Is the subject
building to be affixed to the Moderows’ real estate.
matter of that lease goods, fixtures, or real property? If the lease is
deemed to be a leasehold interest in real property, the WCA will not
316
The subject matter of the lease is the lease of a building
apply.
separate and apart from any real estate interest. Thus, the lease is not a
leasehold interest in real property. Can the building qualify as a good?
“A contract for the sale apart from the land of . . . things attached to
[the] realty and capable of severance without material harm . . . is a
317
In Myhre v. Michigan Silo Co., the
contract for the sale of goods.”
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318. Myhre v. Mich. Silo Co., 220 Wis. 593, 597, 265 N.W. 703, 705 (1936).
319. WIS. STAT. § 409.102(k).
320. Auto Acceptance & Loan Corp. v. Kelm, 18 Wis. 2d 178, 182, 118 N.W.2d 175, 178
(1962).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 65, 432 N.W.2d 617, 618 (Ct.
App. 1988).
324. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(5)(a).
325. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a lender was entitled to remove a
silo from a farm after the farmer defaulted on his loan because there
318
was no material injury to the farm as a result of the removal.
Therefore, it appears that the lease of the building is a lease of goods.
But, a fixture is a good that has become so related to the real estate that
319
an interest arises in it under real property law. Wisconsin uses three
tests to determine whether a good affixed to the real estate has become
320
a fixture or remains personal property. The tests are as follows: “(1)
[a]ctual physical annexation to the real estate; (2) application or
adaptation to the use or purpose [of] which the realty is devoted”; and
(3) whether the person making the annexation intends to make it a
321
permanent accession or not. The main test is the party’s intent at the
322
time of the annexation. In the Moderow case, there is no question that
the parties’ intent was to return the building to the lessor at the end of
323
the lease term. Therefore, the lease of the building did not involve a
fixture but a good. The Moderow lease is a consumer lease, not a
consumer credit sale or a consumer loan.
The first exclusionary clause is further qualified by referring to
consumer credit transactions where the amount financed is greater than
$25,000. The amount financed only applies to transactions that are
324
either a consumer credit sale or a consumer loan. A consumer lease is
not a consumer credit sale or a consumer loan. Therefore, consumer
leases cannot fall within the coverage of the first exclusionary clause,
contrary to the Geiger court decision, which analyzed the transaction
under the first exclusionary clause.
The third exclusionary clause applies to any “other consumer
325
transaction[]” where the cash price exceeds $25,000. What are these
other consumer transactions? On its face, the third exclusionary clause
appears to be the catch-all clause. In other words, what is not included
in the first two clauses is logically included in the third clause. As noted
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above, the first exclusionary clause applies to consumer credit sales and
consumer loans, and the second exclusionary clause applies to motor
vehicle consumer leases. Necessarily, the third exclusionary clause must
apply to any other consumer transaction that does not fall within the
first two exclusionary clauses. Therefore, the third exclusionary clause
will apply to all consumer leases of goods (other than motor vehicle
leases) like Geiger and Moderow.
Second, how should a court calculate the cash price under the third
exclusionary clause for transactions like Geiger and Moderow? A
cursory review of both Geiger and Moderow indicates that there was no
326
cash price between the lessor and lessee in either case.
The third exclusionary clause excludes other consumer transactions
327
where the cash price exceeds $25,000.
The cash price used by the
court in both Moderow and Geiger was the price the lessor spent to
328
purchase the leased item from some third party. But that is not the
cash price of a lease. The WCA defines the cash price as the “price at
which property . . . [is] offered, in the ordinary course of business, for
329
sale for cash.” The consumer transaction subject to measure under the
WCA is the lease between the lessor and lessee not the lessor’s prior
transaction. The current cash value of any future stream of cash
payments (the lease payments) is determined by calculating its present
330
value. For both leases, the “cash value” would be the present value of
the monthly payments over the term of the lease. Those are the values
that should be measured against the $25,000 cap.
C. The First Lien Real Estate Mortgage Exclusion
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326. See discussion supra notes 282–304 and accompanying text.
327. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
328. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d at 69; Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Geiger, 118 Wis. 2d 140,
148, 345 N.W.2d 527, 528-29 (Ct. App. 1984).
329. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(7).
330. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004).
331. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7).
332. Id. § 428.101.
333. Id.
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First lien real estate mortgages or their equivalent security interest
331
are excluded from WCA coverage.
The reason for the exclusion is
that Chapter 428 covers first lien real estate mortgages and their
332
The concept of what constitutes an
equivalent security interest.
333
equivalent security interest has been subject to some interpretation.
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For example, in Ott v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., the Otts purchased
334
a time-share ownership interest in a resort in the Wisconsin Dells. The
Otts signed a time-share contract that provided for installment
payments over eighty-four months, and Peppertree retained title to the
335
In fact, the Otts did
time-share unit until all payments were made.
make payments for five years before they sought to rescind the time336
As part of their rescission action, the Otts claimed
share purchase.
337
that Peppertree had violated the WCA during the initial sale.
Peppertree, on the other hand, argued that the WCA did not apply
because the land contract qualified as a first lien on real estate and was
338
thereby excluded from WCA compliance.
There are, of course, two issues that must be proven before the
exclusion can apply. First, the exclusion requires that the lien must be
339
on real estate. Without any analysis, the court held that the sale of a
340
time-share interest was real estate. Second, the interest must be a first
341
lien on real estate.
On the second issue, the court reasoned that in
order for a transaction to qualify as a first lien on real estate the
342
The Otts argued that Peppertree
transaction must involve a loan.
never advanced any monies to them, so, therefore, there was no loan
343
involved in the transaction. Peppertree acknowledged that it did not
344
advance any monies to the Otts but claimed that their “forbearance”
345
on the balance of the purchase price constituted a loan.
The court
held that the forbearance by Peppertree on the balance of the monies
346
due under the time-share contract did constitute a loan. Further, the
court concluded that the land contract sale of the time-share interest
was analogous to a first lien real estate mortgage or an equivalent
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334. Ott v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 7, 292 Wis. 2d 173, 716
N.W.2d 127.
335. Id. ¶ 31.
336. Id. ¶ 8.
337. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
338. Id. ¶ 30 & n.13.
339. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7) (2011–2012).
340. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 30.
341. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7).
342. See Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶¶ 31–35.
343. Id. ¶ 32.
344. WIS. STAT. §§ 428.102(4), 421.301(23)(d).
345. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 32.
346. Id.; see also State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 134–35, 139, 179 N.W.2d 641,
646, 648 (1970) (holding forbearance on a debt can constitute a loan).
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347

security interest.
As such, the transaction qualified under the WCA
348
exclusion.
In addition to a land contract sale qualifying as an equivalent
security interest, a second mortgage also qualifies if there is no
intervening lien and the mortgagee holds the first mortgage on the
349
property as well. However, even if there is an intervening lien holder,
advances made by the first mortgage holder, after the intervening lien
350
holder, can relate back to the first mortgage holder’s priority date. In
Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, the debtors purchased real estate pursuant
351
to a recorded land contract. Coincidentally, the debtors executed and
352
recorded a CRESA in favor of the Bank of Barron. The purpose of
the CRESA was to give the Bank a lien on the debtors’ property in the
353
event the Bank made future advances to the debtors. In fact, the Bank
did eventually make thirty-six advances to the debtors, of which, five
advances were outstanding at the time of the Bank’s foreclosure
354
action. All five advances made by the Bank were made after a second
355
mortgage holder recorded an interest in the debtors’ property.
Two issues arose with regard to the five advances. First, did the
advances have priority over the second mortgage holder since the
advances were made after the recording of the second mortgage? The
court noted that the law in Wisconsin is fairly well settled that if a first
mortgage holder is contractually obligated to make an advance, the
advance dates back to the original mortgage recording date and would
356
have priority over an intervening second mortgage holder.
Conversely, if the future advance made by the first mortgage holder is
optional and the first mortgage holder has actual knowledge of the
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347. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 35; see also Milbrandt v. Huber, 149 Wis. 2d 275, 288, 440
N.W.2d 807, 811 (Ct. App. 1989) (“The relationship between vendor and vendee in a land
contract is analogous to that of equitable mortgagor and mortgagee.”); WIS. ADMIN. CODE
DFI-WCA § 1.261 (July 2007) (providing that “[T]he term ‘equivalent security interest’ as
used in WIS. STAT § 422.202(2)(b) . . . include[s] a seller’s interest under a land contract”).
348. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 35.
349. DFI-WCA § 1.261.
350. Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 464–65, 485 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Ct. App.
1992).
351. Id. at 447.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 462.
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357. Id. at 462–63; see also Colonial Bank v. Marine Bank, N.A., 152 Wis. 2d 444, 447,
448 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1989).
358. Bank of Barron, 169 Wis. 2d at 463.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 459, 464.
361. Id. at 464.
362. Id. at 459.
363. Id. at 464.
364. Id.
365. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7) (2011–2012).
366. Id. § 421.301(17).
367. Bank of Barron, 169 Wis. at 460 (noting that the $68,000 advance (third advance)
did not reference the CRESA but was given priority because by paying off the land contract
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intervening second mortgage holder at the time of the advance, the
357
second mortgage holder has priority.
With regard to the first three
advances made by the Bank, the court concluded that the Bank did not
have actual knowledge of the existence of the second mortgage holder
at the time of the advances, and as such, the advances related back to
358
the original recording date. However, the Bank made the fourth and
fifth advances with actual knowledge of the second mortgage holder’s
359
position. Both the fourth and fifth advances were made to renew or
360
re-amortize prior notes. The court noted that a new note that renews
361
an old note assumes the priority position of the old note. The court
held that the fourth advance was subordinate to the second mortgage
holder because the fourth advance did not relate back to the CRESA
and it renewed a loan that occurred after the recording of the second
362
mortgage. With regard to the fifth advance, the court held that even
though it was made with actual knowledge of the second mortgage
holder’s position, the fifth advance had priority over the second
363
mortgage holder. The court reasoned that the fifth advance renewed a
note issued prior to the second mortgage holder’s recorded position and
related back to the CRESA recording date despite its actual knowledge
364
at the time of the advance.
The second issue is why did the first lien real estate exclusion not
apply since four of the five advances related back to the first mortgage
recording date? The first lien real estate mortgage exclusion applies to
exclude all first lien real estate mortgages notwithstanding the amount
365
However, the WCA does provide that a merchant can
of the loan.
366
As a result, the court reasoned that the
agree to be subject to it.
lender implicitly agreed to be subject to the WCA because the
367
documentation that evidenced the four advances
specifically
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referenced the prior CRESA loans.

368

III. CONCLUSION
369

The WCA applies to consumer credit transactions. The three most
common types of consumer credit transactions are consumer credit
370
sales, consumer leases, and open-end credit plans. It is important to
distinguish between these three different types of consumer credit
transactions because different parts of the WCA will apply to a
transaction depending upon its classification.
371
But a
A true lease or bailment is not a consumer credit sale.
372
disguised lease or bailment is a consumer credit sale. A true lease or
bailment is distinguished from a disguised one by determining whether
the lessee or bailee can become the owner of the leased or bailed item
373
for no additional or nominal consideration. Wisconsin uses four tests
374
to determine whether a consideration is nominal. However, the WCA
did not provide for those leases or bailments where the consideration is
not nominal, yet the transaction is a disguised lease or bailment. For
those situations, Wisconsin courts should use the economic realities test
to determine whether the transaction is a true lease or bailment, or a
disguised consumer credit sale.
For consumer leases, there are a number of issues. The primary
issue, however, is whether the lease is a consumer lease or a commercial
375
The courts
lease. Commercial leases are not subject to the WCA.
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the advance became subrogated to the land contract recording date that was prior to the
second mortgage holder).
368. Id. at 458.
369. WIS. STAT. § 421.201.
370. Id. § 421.301(10).
371. See id. § 421.301(9) (omitting true lease or bailment from the definition of
“[c]onsumer credit sale”).
372. See id. § 421.102(1)–(2) (explaining that the provisions and definitions of the WCA
should be construed broadly and liberally so as to comport with the underlying purpose of
protecting consumers); see also LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 592–93,
589 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the WCA shall be read liberally “to
promote the underlying purposes of the Act and [to] look[] beyond the transaction’s form to
its substance,” and accordingly to include disguised leases).
373. See Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 70, 432 N.W.2d 617, 619
(Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the bailment agreement at issue created a lease agreement
rather than a consumer credit sale because there was no option to purchase).
374. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
375. Id. at 768 (explaining that while the UCC was intended to cover complex
commercial transactions like commercial leases, the WCA was not intended to cover complex

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 50 Side A

01/13/2014 11:22:05

ANZIVINO 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT

12/3/2013 1:57 PM

91

have developed an objective test that involves considering many factors
376
in deciding the proper classification for a lease.
Open-end credit plans are subject to the most disclosures under the
377
WCA.
An ordinary credit transaction also has disclosure
requirements, but they are significantly less than an open-end credit
378
A cash transaction, on the other hand, has no disclosure
plan.
requirements even if the debtor does not make the cash payment as
379
agreed, and a credit relationship ensues. The courts have developed a
number of tests for distinguishing the open-end credit plan from the
ordinary credit transaction, and for distinguishing the cash transaction,
which is not subject to the WCA disclosure requirements, from the two
380
credit transactions.
The article also dealt with the two most common exclusions under
the WCA–consumer transactions that exceed $25,000 and the first lien
real estate mortgage. There are actually three different transactions
that fall under the $25,000 exclusion: (1) consumer credit transactions
381
where the amount financed exceeds $25,000; (2) motor vehicle
382
consumer leases where the total lease obligation exceeds $25,000; and
(3) any other consumer transaction where the cash price exceeds
383
$25,000. Each exclusion has its own unique legal issues. For example,
multiple loans or advances between parties are generally analyzed as
individual advances, not one total transaction, when applying the
384
$25,000 cap. Despite the $25,000 cap, however, advances that exceed
$25,000 can be covered by WCA depending upon the language used in
385
the documents evidencing the transaction.
Also, the calculation of
cash price has perplexed the courts, and a proposal is offered to assist in
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commercial transactions, but instead was meant to cover transactions involving “the average
consumer”).
376. See Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS 202, at *4–6
(Feb. 22, 1994) (discussing considerations taken into account by the trial court).
377. Compare WIS. STAT. § 422.308, with WIS. STAT. § 422.302.
378. WIS. STAT. § 422.302.
379. See discussion supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
380. See discussion supra Part I.C.
381. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425, 448, 597 N.W.2d 462, 474 (Ct. App.
1999).
385. See Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 457, 485 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Ct. App.
1992).
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that calculation.
386
Finally, the first lien real estate mortgages exclusion was analyzed.
Those interests that qualify as equivalent security interests were
387
identified.
Also, guidelines were provided for analyzing the priority
dispute between a first lien holder and a second lien holder when the
first lien holder makes future advances after the second lien holder is of
388
record.
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